Magix Hack
Incident Overview
The project was holding a fundraising event using MagixPresale smart contract, which received 332.9 ETH. List of received transactions:
https://bloxy.info/txs/transfers_to/0x0f60125c…336278?currency_id=1
106.5 ETH was added to the initial liquidity by the proxy contract:
https://etherscan.io/tx/0xfedb5f90…b4ac47
264.5 ETH was deposited to the Tornado Cash mixer at:
https://etherscan.io/address/0xd01674a8…c8a25e
https://etherscan.io/address/0x0a77eb9b…83b88e
The contract deployer received LP tokens from the proxy contract, which added the initial liquidity earlier:
https://etherscan.io/tx/0x21ff6db5…5f1b98
The liquidity was removed by the contract deployer few times:
https://etherscan.io/tx/0x33751572…11048b
https://etherscan.io/tx/0xba6e28ac…4701f0
https://etherscan.io/tx/0xd038ac5b…d0f784
https://etherscan.io/tx/0x8a1c9f13…df2e37
Incident Report
Protocol Information
Market Context at Time of Hack
What the Attacker Needed to Succeed
Understanding the prerequisites for this type of attack helps auditors identify protocols that are most at risk and helps developers build better defenses.
What Auditors Should Check
If you're auditing a protocol with similar architecture to Magix, these are the critical security checks that could have prevented this incident (December 2020).
- Verify all logic paths related to Rugpull are guarded by proper access controls and input validation
- Review privileged functions (owner, admin, governance) for potential abuse vectors - centralization risks should be documented and bounded with timelocks or multi-sigs
Master these auditing techniques with hands-on labs and real exploit scenarios in the Smart Contract Hacking course.
Free TrialSources & References
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Source 1 https://magix.finance/
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Learn to Prevent the Next Magix
The Magix hack is one of many attacks that skilled auditors are trained to detect before deployment. Master real exploit patterns and defense techniques with hands-on Web3 security training.