SAILSAN Hack
Incident Overview
The contract deployer added initial liquidity at:
https://etherscan.io/tx/0x95674038…06dbfe
The contract deployer transferred part of the tokens to some external address:
https://etherscan.io/tx/0x9c95b164…1069d5
The recipient sold them at:
https://etherscan.io/tx/0x1054d3a1…923343
https://etherscan.io/tx/0x73863e7d…70c086
The contract deployer removed liquidity at:
https://etherscan.io/tx/0x334accd3…048c4b
Incident Report
Protocol Information
What the Attacker Needed to Succeed
Understanding the prerequisites for this type of attack helps auditors identify protocols that are most at risk and helps developers build better defenses.
What Auditors Should Check
If you're auditing a protocol with similar architecture to SAILSAN, these are the critical security checks that could have prevented this incident (November 2020).
- Verify all logic paths related to Rugpull are guarded by proper access controls and input validation
- Review privileged functions (owner, admin, governance) for potential abuse vectors - centralization risks should be documented and bounded with timelocks or multi-sigs
Master these auditing techniques with hands-on labs and real exploit scenarios in the Smart Contract Hacking course.
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