Tomatos Hack
Incident Overview
The withdrawal of the user's funds was possible by the smart contract's unlimited malicious approval, which granted attacker to take DAI, TrueUSD, USDC-Tomatoes LP, USDC, USDT, and UNI from users' wallets. Users that deposited ETH during the pre-sale did not get project tokens. The project's social media is inaccessible. Stolen funds were deposited into Tornado mixer:
Example transactions of withdrawal from the fake contracts:
https://etherscan.io/tx/0x264e1a5a…8a11c6
https://etherscan.io/tx/0xb0b725ca…6ac3ae
https://etherscan.io/tx/0xcab4d6e0…99ddc3
https://etherscan.io/tx/0xcbf6858d…7d1d89
https://etherscan.io/tx/0x5399f79a…5b3b34
https://etherscan.io/tx/0x7d61c0b1…76ec74
https://etherscan.io/tx/0x7efa4390…9bf101
https://etherscan.io/tx/0x3e51d5f0…4addfc
Incident Report
Protocol Information
Market Context at Time of Hack
What the Attacker Needed to Succeed
Understanding the prerequisites for this type of attack helps auditors identify protocols that are most at risk and helps developers build better defenses.
What Auditors Should Check
If you're auditing a protocol with similar architecture to Tomatos, these are the critical security checks that could have prevented this incident (September 2020).
- Verify all logic paths related to Rugpull are guarded by proper access controls and input validation
- Review privileged functions (owner, admin, governance) for potential abuse vectors - centralization risks should be documented and bounded with timelocks or multi-sigs
Master these auditing techniques with hands-on labs and real exploit scenarios in the Smart Contract Hacking course.
Free TrialSources & References
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Source 1 https://t.me/defiyield_ann/69
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Learn to Prevent the Next Tomatos
The Tomatos hack is one of many attacks that skilled auditors are trained to detect before deployment. Master real exploit patterns and defense techniques with hands-on Web3 security training.