UniCat.farm Hack

TOTAL LOST $713K
Low Rugpull ethereum

Summarize with AI

Affected Chain ethereum Incident surface
Recovered - No recovery reported
All-Time Rank #917 By amount stolen
Protocol Type Exit Scam/Rugpull Target category

Incident Overview

Function setGovernance() was executed 8 times on the farm contract which allowed the external wallet to withdraw staked tokens:

https://bloxy.info/txs/calls_from/0x3b01feb6…8af8b0?signature_id=1270634&smart_contract_address_bin=0xb246bcd5…8e42cd

Then liquidity was removed:

https://etherscan.io/tx/0x3d9df9fb…bb6644

https://etherscan.io/tx/0x8e54ed37…d9cab1

https://etherscan.io/tx/0x98172882…0a918f

https://etherscan.io/tx/0x94addda7…62f896

https://etherscan.io/tx/0x0f59d547…dd8a3d

https://etherscan.io/tx/0x52bf0897…fb7222

https://etherscan.io/tx/0x0f51d522…b56ca0

https://etherscan.io/tx/0xbb5a3a13…8d8a3e

Stolen funds were mixed with others in the long chain of transactions. But the last ones used Tornado Cash:

https://etherscan.io/tx/0xcf5292ba…805f44

https://etherscan.io/tx/0x3d5b4f7c…f7467e

https://etherscan.io/tx/0xac32ddd5…763962

https://etherscan.io/tx/0x599f44a3…0efa0b

Incident Report

Protocol / Project UniCat.farm
Date of Incident
Affected Chain(s) ethereum
Attack Technique Rugpull
Classification Exchange (DEX)
Primary Source View Post-Mortem

Protocol Information

Protocol Type Exit Scam/Rugpull
Affected Token MEOW
Official Website unicat.farm/
Protocol Twitter/X @unicatFarm

What the Attacker Needed to Succeed

Understanding the prerequisites for this type of attack helps auditors identify protocols that are most at risk and helps developers build better defenses.

Technical Knowledge Deep understanding of rugpull and Solidity and EVM internals
Capital Required Seed capital to cover gas and initial position setup
On-Chain Access Ability to interact with ethereum smart contracts and deploy a custom exploit contract
Protocol Analysis Identification of the exploitable vulnerability in UniCat.farm's contract logic - root cause: exchange (dex)
Execution Speed Precise transaction ordering and timing to exploit the vulnerability within a single atomic block
Obfuscation Plan A strategy to launder and move stolen funds - typically through mixers, cross-chain bridges, or decentralized DEX swaps to resist tracing

What Auditors Should Check

Could this have been caught in audit? Hard to catch — private key / OpSec failures are outside smart contract audit scope

If you're auditing a protocol with similar architecture to UniCat.farm, these are the critical security checks that could have prevented this incident (September 2020).

  • Verify all logic paths related to Rugpull are guarded by proper access controls and input validation
  • Review privileged functions (owner, admin, governance) for potential abuse vectors - centralization risks should be documented and bounded with timelocks or multi-sigs

Master these auditing techniques with hands-on labs and real exploit scenarios in the Smart Contract Hacking course.

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Sources & References

Learn to Prevent the Next UniCat.farm

The UniCat.farm hack is one of many attacks that skilled auditors are trained to detect before deployment. Master real exploit patterns and defense techniques with hands-on Web3 security training.

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